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Modern Implications for George MacDonald’s 
Nineteenth-Century Apologetic
Dean Hardy
The following is an excerpt from Hardy’s book Waking the Dead: George 
MacDonald as Philosopher, Mystic, and Apologist published by Winged Lion 
Press (2020).  Excerpt used by permission.
 To inquire of the famous apologists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, one would likely stumble on a list including, but not 
limited to, William Paley, Alexander B. Bruce, John Henry Newman and 
Abraham Kuyper; but one would be hard-pressed to find George MacDonald 
included in a list of these apologists. Usually the only connection MacDonald 
finds to the realm of apologetics or philosophy is when he is mentioned in the 
same breath as C.S. Lewis. Otherwise, MacDonald is regarded for his literary 
efforts, his practical theology, and the rest is ignored. But is there legitimacy 
for this dismissal from the realm of apologetics? 
 First and foremost, let us establish our terminology. From Norman 
Geisler’s perspective, “Apologetics is the discipline that deals with a rational 
defense of Christian faith.”1 Stephen Cowan agrees that “apologetics has to 
do with the defending, or making a case for, the truth of the Christian faith.”2  
While these two definitions seem to lean toward a conflation of apologetics 
and rationality, others, like Bernard Ramm, have a more general approach: 
“Christian apologetics is the strategy of setting forth the truthfulness of the 
Christian faith and its right to the claim of knowledge of God.”3 He even goes 
so far as to say, “However, not all Christian apologetics come with a clear 
label . . . whatever deals with truth or with knowledge with respect to the 
Christian faith is apologetically in scope and content.”4 While Ramm 
1. Norman Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 
1999), 70. 
2. Stephen Cowan, Five Views on Apologetics, ed. Stephen Cowan (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
2000), 8.
3. Bernard Ramm, Varieties of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 
1961), 13.
4. Ibid., 13.
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goes on to list other genres of books in apologetic nature such as philosophy 
of religion, philosophical treatises like Kant’s Critiques, and Philosophical 
Theology, he never mentions works of fiction, but it is possible that he would 
have been open to that possibility, as long as those works of fiction were 
involved in “setting forth the truthfulness of the Christian faith.”  Hans Frei 
even goes further in his generality of apologetics: “I have used the term 
apologetics to cover (among other things) this appeal to a common ground 
between analysis of human experience by direct natural thought and by some 
distinctively Christian thought.”5 
 Some automatically unite rationality and apologetics, and this is 
unequivocally an inappropriate conflation of terms. Dr. Geisler, a foremost 
popular apologist in this present era, used the term “rational” in his definition. 
While this fact would have to be conceded, it would be a mistake not to call 
attention to the fact that in Geisler’s own encyclopedia of apologetics he 
has an entry for “experiential apologetics” which is a “form of defending 
the faith” that does not rely on rational arguments, but instead, “appeals to 
Christian experience.”6 While Geisler is a critic of such an approach, he 
does not argue that this method is not apologetics at all, but rather, that it is 
simply not an effective approach. Thus, we are going to adopt the definition 
of James Van Eerden who, in his Master’s Thesis entitled An Inquiry into the 
Use of Human Experience as an Apologetic Tool, writes, “The task of the 
apologist is to defend and advance the central tenets of the Christian faith.”7 
Apologetics is simply the defense of, and an attempt at clearly articulating 
the central beliefs of Christianity. While, at this point, one may still question 
such a label applying to George MacDonald, my book Waking the Dead: 
George MacDonald as Philosopher, Mystic, and Apologist traces the attitude 
and approaches to apologetics in MacDonald’s historical context, as well 
as defends MacDonald’s placement amongst apologetic scholars of such 
distinction. The article below focuses on the first of these two topics of study. 
 An Overview of Apologetic Strategies 
 during the Nineteenth Century
5. Hans W. Frei, “Apologetics, Criticism, and the Loss of Narrative Interpretation” in Why 
Narrative? : Readings in Narrative Theology, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and L. Gregory Jones 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 49.
6. Norman Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetic, 235.
7. James Patrick Van Eerden, An Inquiry into the Use of Human Experience as an Apologetic 
Tool: Illustrations from the Writings of George MacDonald, G.K. Chesterton and C.S. Lewis  
(Master’s Thesis: Grove City College, 1995), 1.
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 Apologists “have reasoned their way throughout the centuries, 
sometimes forcefully and sometimes feebly.”8 Every era has its apologetic 
character and epistemic focus, and the eighteenth century was dominated by 
an appeal to rationalism and the primacy of science and reason. The Christian 
apologists during this era focused on “two basic theistic proofs: the argument 
from miracle and prophecy and the argument from design.”9 As will be seen 
below, this method was “highly scrutinized and came under severe attack by 
thinkers who were themselves committed to the ideals and scientific methods 
of the Age of Reason.”10 Even modern philosophical historians have disdain 
for such an era: “Like the Temple of Reason in Notre Dame de Paris, the 
popularity of the cult of reason was relatively short-lived.”11
 It would be an easy task simply to paint the nineteenth century 
apologists as reacting to this rational approach, but the fact of the matter is 
that this era was a tug-of-war between the traditional rationalist approach 
on one side and the Romantics and skeptics on the other. Hans Frei points 
out that this was not an anomaly, but rather, this has happened quite often 
in the history of apologetics and theology: “Modern mediating theology 
gives an impression of constantly building, tearing down, rebuilding, and 
tearing down again the same edifice. Notable instances of this procedure are 
the revolt of nineteenth-century Christian liberals against the ‘evidence’—
seeking theology of the eighteenth century, the revolt of the so-called 
dialectical or neo-orthodox theologians against nineteenth-century liberalism 
in the 1920s, and contemporary arguments in favor of the meaningfulness 
of a specific Christian ‘language game’ among all the other language games 
people play.”12 To make the point clear, and before we continue into specific 
apologists and Christian theologians in the nineteenth century, all one would 
have to do is contrast the work of two prominent thinkers at the turn of 
the century.  Friedrich Schleiermacher believed that theological “truth was 
now to be found in the symbolic rendering of the experiences of the life of 
feelings”13 and was famous for “deemphasizing the fatal falseness of 
our reasons and passions.”14 Schleiermacher elevated subjective experience 
8. Ibid., 1.
9. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought Vol. 1: The Enlightenment and the Nine-
teenth Century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 50.
10. Ibid., 83.
11. Ibid., 400.
12. Hans W. Frei, “Apologetics, Criticism, and the Loss of Narrative Interpretation,” 49.
13. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 105.
14. Nicola Hoggard Creegan, “Schleiermacher as apologist: Reclaiming the Father of Modern 
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and diminished the cognitive faculties. In contrast, William Paley argued that 
knowledge of God could be found through our senses and rational faculties. 
In his Natural Theology and Tracts in 1802, he writes: 
The existence, the agency, the wisdom, of the Deity, could be testified 
to his rational creatures. This is the scale by which we ascend to all 
the knowledge of our Creator which we possess, so far as it depends 
upon the phenomena, or the works of nature.  Take away this, and 
you take away from us every subject of observation, and ground of 
reasoning; I mean as our rational faculties are formed at present.  
Whatever is done, God could have done without the intervention of 
instruments or means; but it is in the construction of instruments, 
in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is 
seen.15
 During this time period, “religion and science were in mutual 
support. And such continued to be the prevalent view in the opening years 
of the nineteenth century, when the writings of William Paley in this country 
were at the height of their popularity. . . . The scientific spirit now permeated 
thought in all its ranges,” but as science began to take a larger grip on the 
minds of the populace, “the appeal to natural phenomena in evidence of the 
divine existence and attributes began to lose its former cogency.”16 In fact, to 
some, including those who will be discussed later, Paley’s arguments became 
regarded as “frigid and unpersuasive.”17
 Thus, the apologetic spirit of the nineteenth century was not 
homogenous, but it was within this conflict and metaphorical tug-of-war 
where MacDonald’s life and work was positioned. Even more specifically, 
in the midpoint of MacDonald’s career, there was heightened conflict in the 
arena of apologetics: “A clash between religious beliefs and scientific theory 
was thus inevitable: first, on the question of the Genesis story of the creation, 
then on Darwinism, especially as propounded by T.H. Huxley, whose respect 
for the susceptibilities of theologians was minimal, and finally on the doctrine 
of materialism generally, a philosophy destructive of all spiritual values. The 
issue of science versus religion was most prominent from about 1860 
Theology” in Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World, ed. by Timothy R. Phillips & 
Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 60.
15. William Paley, Natural Theology and Tracts (New York: S. King, 1824), 31.
16. Bernard M.G. Reardon, Religious Thought in the Victorian Age: A Survey from Coleridge 
to Gore (New York: Longman, 1995), 210-211.
17. Ibid., 3.
to 1880, when both sides were in the mood for conflict, the theologians 
from an authoritarian confidence whetted by fear, the scientists (or their 
publicists) from an exhilaration born of achievements.”18 In the midst of 
that chaos, MacDonald wrote Weighed and Wanting in which he had his 
protagonist state, “I should be the last to encourage the atheism that is getting 
so frightfully common, but really it seems to me such extravagant notions 
about religion as you have been brought up in must have not a little to do 
with the present sad state of affairs—must in fact go far to make atheists.”19 
MacDonald thought that the staunch Calvinism and the rationalistic 
apologetics that permeated his culture often had ill effect upon the very 
laymen that they were supposed to be helping. As a prophet’s dissonant voice 
in the wilderness calls for change, so was the voice of François-René de 
Chateaubriand in 1802.
 Chateaubriand’s Le Genie du Christianisme, or, the Genius of 
Christianity “published in the spring of 1802, marked the beginning of 
a new style in apologetics. Philosophically null, it disclosed all the same 
and emotional thirst for religions which only the living imagination could 
satisfy.”20 He “initiated a new apologetics that looked to the beauty and to 
the cultural institutions of the past that were, he argued, the achievement of 
the Catholic genius. The Traditionalists turned away from abstract argument 
and appealed, rather, to the ‘giveness’ of a primal divine revelation, passed 
on over the centuries . . .”21 This work marked a turning of the tide in 
nineteenth century apologetics. He saw the issues in modern apologetics, 
noted them, and cast them aside to take on a new direction: “The defenders 
of the Christians fell into an error which had before undone them: they did 
not perceive that the question was no longer to discuss this or that particular 
tenet since the very foundation on which these tenets were built was rejected 
by their opponents. By starting from the mission of Jesus Christ, and 
descending from one consequence to another, they established the truths of 
faith on a solid basis; but this mode of reasoning, which might have suited the 
seventeenth century extremely well, when the groundwork was not 
contested, proved of no use in our days.”22 The following excerpt explains 
18. Ibid., 10.
19. George MacDonald, Weighed and Wanting, 481.
20. Bernard M.G. Reardon, Religious Thought in the Victorian Age, 7. 
21. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 356.
22. François-René Chateaubriand, The Genius of Christianity; or the Spirit and Beauty of the 
Christian Religion, translated by Charles I. White (Philadelphia: John Murphy & Co., 1884), 
48.
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Chateaubriand’s commitment to rejecting the old, and embarking on new 
avenues of demonstration of the truth of the Christian faith:
It was, therefore, necessary to prove that, on the contrary, the 
Christian religion, of all the religions that ever existed, is the most 
humane, the most favorable to liberty and to the arts and sciences; 
that the modern world is indebted to it for every improvement, 
from agriculture to the abstract sciences—from the hospitals for the 
reception of the unfortunate to the temples reared by the Michael 
Angelo’s and embellished by the Raphael’s. It was necessary to prove 
that nothing is more divine than its morality—nothing more lovely 
and more sublime than its tenets, its doctrine, and its worship; that it 
encourages genius, corrects the taste, develops the virtuous passions, 
imparts energy to the ideas, presents noble images to the writer, 
and perfect models to the artist; that there is no disgrace in being 
believers with Newton and Bossuet, with Pascal and Racine. In a 
word, it was necessary to summon all the charms of the imagination, 
and all the interests of the heart, to the assistance of that religion 
against which they had been set in array. 
 The reader may now have clear view of the object of our 
work. All other kinds of apologies are exhausted, and perhaps they 
would be useless at the present day. Who would now sit down to read 
work professedly theological? Possibly few sincere Christians who 
are already convinced. But, it may be asked, may there not be some 
danger in considering religion in merely human point of view? Why 
so? Does our religion shrink from the light? Surely one great proof of 
its divine origin is, that it will bear the test of the fullest and severest 
scrutiny of reason. Would you have us always open to the reproach 
of enveloping our tenets in sacred obscurity, lest their falsehood 
should be detected? Will Christianity be the less true for appearing 
the more beautiful? Let us banish our weak apprehensions; let us not, 
by an excess of religion, leave religion to perish. We no longer live in 
those times when you might say, ‘Believe without inquiring.’ People 
will inquire in spite of us; and our timid silence, in heightening the 
triumph of the infidel, will diminish the number of believers. 
It is time that the world should know to what all those charges of 
absurdity, vulgarity, and meanness, that are daily alleged against 
Christianity, may be reduced. It is time to demonstrate, that, instead 
of debasing the ideas, it encourages the soul to take the most daring 
flights, and is capable of enchanting the imagination as divinely as 
the deities of Homer and Virgil. Our arguments will at least have 
this advantage, that they will be intelligible to the world at large, and 
will require nothing but common sense to determine their weight 
and strength. In works of this kind authors neglect, perhaps rather 
too much, to speak the language of their readers. It is necessary to 
be scholar with scholar, and poet with poet. The Almighty does not 
forbid us to tread the flowery path, if it serves to lead the wanderer 
once more to him; nor is it always by the steep and rugged mountain 
that the lost sheep finds its way back to the fold.23 
 Chateaubriand started on this journey focused on the positive and 
beautiful attributes of Christianity, and his insistence on limiting the usage 
of metaphysical proofs: “Adhering scrupulously to our plan, we shall 
banish all abstract ideas from our proofs of the existence of God and the 
immortality of the soul, and shall employ only such arguments as may be 
derived from poetical and sentimental considerations, or, in other words, 
from the wonders of nature and the moral feelings.”24 Again, he remarks 
with specificity: “Without entering too deeply into metaphysical proofs, 
which we have studiously avoided, we shall nevertheless endeavor to answer 
certain objections which are incessantly brought forward.”25 As stated in the 
extended excerpt above, he thought that to expect a non-believer to sit down 
and read a theological text would be unlikely, and even if this were to take 
place, it would be unconvincing. But to throw out reason would be to throw 
out the baby with the bathwater. For Christianity should be able to “bear the 
test of the fullest and severest scrutiny of reason.”26  
 While Livingston states that Chateaubriand “considered the 
rationalistic arguments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries— 
regarding such matters as revelation, miracles, and God—to be exhausted—
and useless,”27 and although there is truth to this claim, it is a slight 
overstatement. For even while Chateaubriand claimed to repudiate these 
proofs he stated the following: “To complete what we have said on the 
existence of God and the immortality of the soul, we shall here present the 
23. François-René Chateaubriand, The Genius of Christianity; or the Spirit and Beauty of the 
Christian Religion, 46-50.
24. Ibid., 138. 
25. Ibid., 191.
26. Ibid., 49.
27. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 144.
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metaphysical proofs of these truths.”28 After which, Chateaubriand makes 
an end note and lists metaphysical proofs as an addendum to his work. If 
these were completely useless, why list them as a supplement? To digress, 
the sentiment that Chateaubriand sought to reduce the usage of metaphysical 
proofs, and in order to appeal to the common sense and the beauty in man, 
still holds. For an example of his style of argument, take his version of the 
teleological argument, with some suggestion of the anthropic principle:
We cannot conceive what scene of confusion nature would present 
if it were abandoned to the sole movements of matter. The clouds, 
obedient to the laws of gravity, would fall perpendicularly upon 
the earth, or ascend in pyramids into the air; moment afterward the 
atmosphere would be too dense or too rarefied for the organs of 
respiration. The moon, either too near or too distant, would at one 
time be invisible, at another would appear bloody and covered with 
enormous spots, or would alone fill the whole celestial concave 
with her disproportionate orb. Seized, as it were, with strange kind 
of madness, she would pass from one eclipse to another, or, rolling 
from side to side, would exhibit that portion of her surface which 
earth has never yet beheld. The stars would appear to be under the 
influence of the same capricious power; and nothing would be seen 
but succession of tremendous conjunctions. One of the summer signs 
would be speedily overtaken by one of the signs of winter; the Cow-
herd would lead the Pleiades, and the Lion would roar in Aquarius; 
here the stars would dart along with the rapidity of lightning, there 
they would be suspended motionless; sometimes, crowding together 
in groups, they would form new galaxy; at others, disappearing all at 
once, and, to use the expression of Tertullian, reading the curtain of 
the universe, they would expose to view the abysses of eternity.29  
 Note that, for Chateaubriand, poetic style coexists with substance. 
He makes no metaphysical connections, no abstract reasoning; he merely 
encourages the reader, in expressive fashion, to ponder the universe and 
contemplate its obvious order and dependence on a divine coordinator. 
While there is no evidence of an interaction between this Frenchman and 
MacDonald, it will be demonstrated that they both had a similar distaste for 
28. François-René Chateaubriand, The Genius of Christianity; or the Spirit and Beauty of the 
Christian Religion, 695.
29. François-René Chateaubriand, The Genius of Christianity; or the Spirit and Beauty of the 
Christian Religion, 140-141.
mere metaphysical argumentation, thus independently reflecting an aspect of 
the spirit of the times, and both had an imaginative-apologetic style.
 Of all of the Christian thinkers, theologians, and apologists in this 
brief survey of the apologetic landscape in the nineteenth century, Coleridge 
is the one with the strongest connection to George MacDonald.30 Not only 
is he often mentioned in MacDonald’s works, but MacDonald calls him a 
“sage” and is said to have opened Wordsworth’s eyes “to such visions”; he 
even goes so far as to say that “the ecstasy is even loftier in Coleridge than 
in Wordsworth.”31 Thus it is not an exaggeration to suggest that he held 
Coleridge’s perspective and literary prowess in high regard. 
 Similarly to other Romantics during this era, Coleridge limited the 
impact of rationalistic arguments and, instead, focused on the imagination. 
Coleridge’s system of thought was an exemplar of his era. In the age of 
Coleridge, “reason was quickened, sometimes indeed superseded, by 
imagination . . . the knowledge of truth, for the Romantic mind, was a 
visionary experience, an intuition or immediate beholding. But vision, 
intuition, is of its very nature subjective proof. External proof is irrelevant, 
even alien to it.”32  
 Coleridge himself explains his disdain for the focus on rationalistic 
argumentation and evidence: “I more than fear, the prevailing taste for 
Books of Natural Theology, Physico-theology, Demonstrations of God from 
Nature, Evidences of Christianity, and the like. Evidences of Christianity! 
I am weary of the Word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you 
can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its 
own Evidence—remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself: 
No man cometh to me, unless the Father leadeth him!”33 As will be explored 
later, this analogy of waking, or rousing the lost sleeper sounds profoundly 
similar to MacDonald’s own words: “Let the dead bury their dead, and the 
dead teach their dead; for me, I will try to wake them.”34  
 Unfortunately for Coleridge, similarly to how Chateaubriand was 
treated above, many proof-text his statements, and conclude that he was 
completely anti-rationalistic. Note Reardon’s assessment: “Current religious 
30. Gisela H. Kreglinger, “Reading Scripture in Crisis: The Victorian Crisis of Faith and Mac-
Donald’s Response to Coleridge,” 81.
31. George MacDonald, England’s Antiphon, 307.
32. Bernard M.G. Reardon, Religious Thought in the Victorian Age, 7.
33. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection. (London: Hurst, Chance & Company, 2nd 
edition, 1831), 399. Collected Works of STC 9 ed. John Beer, 405-6.
34. George MacDonald, Unspoken Sermons, “Righteousness,” 268.
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discussion, in so far as it ventured upon philosophical problems at all, 
fastened on the ‘evidences’ of Christianity, chiefly in an attempt to refuse 
the skeptic Hume. Coleridge’s aim was to break entirely with these arid and 
unconvincing methods . . . For not only was evidence-theology useless—
ineffectual for its own end; it was also false in principle. Its procedure was 
purely rationalistic and made no appeal to religious feeling. To the believer 
external evidences are unnecessary: he builds his faith on other grounds; 
whilst the philosophically minded unbeliever they rest on a mistaken premise. 
The reader Coleridge sought to address was the intelligent doubter, especially 
if he were among the young, whom the conventional arguments left 
untouched.”35 Reardon seems to argue that Coleridge was completely anti-
rationalistic, and if we were to take the Coleridge passage above and extract 
it from the rest of his work, it would be easy to arrive at this conclusion, 
but as we see below, in an excerpt from the same work by Coleridge quoted 
above, this is not completely the case:
Do I then utterly exclude the speculative Reason from Theology? 
No! It is its office and rightful privilege to determine on the negative 
truth of whatever we are required to believe. The doctrine must not 
contradict any universal principle: for this would be a Doctrine that 
contradicted itself. Or Philosophy? No. It may be and has been the 
servant and pioneer of Faith by convincing the mind, that a doctrine 
is cogitable, that the soul can present the Idea to itself; and that if we 
determine to contemplate, or think of, the subject at all, so and in no 
other form can this be effected. So far are both Logic and Philosophy 
to be received and trusted. But the duty, and in some cases and for 
some persons even the right, of thinking on subjects beyond the 
bounds of sensible experience; the grounds of the Real truth; the Life, 
the Substance, the Hope, the Love, in one word, the Faith;—these are 
derivatives from the practical, moral, and spiritual Nature and Being 
of Man.36 
 Thus, for Coleridge, as for Chateaubriand, logic, philosophy, and 
even apologetics have their place, but not in the heightened state in which the 
spirit of the prior age had elevated them. In the same way that MacDonald 
had been charged with being “anti-science,” so have these Romantic writers 
been charged with “anti-rationalism,” when these thinkers seem merely trying 
to take rationalism and science off of the pedestal on which they have been 
35. Bernard M.G. Reardon, Religious Thought in the Victorian Age, 46-47.
36. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, 177. Collected Works 9, 188.
erected, lowering them to a more humble position of priority. While there is 
some incongruity among historians on Coleridge’s own words, there is no 
doubt that Coleridge himself “was a man for whom any rationale of faith 
must be made in essentially personal terms . . . It was something which every 
man must work out for himself.”37 
 With Coleridge being the last of the Romantics we will cover in 
this section, it should be pointed out that the theme of most nineteenth 
century Romantics, and with MacDonald as well, was to find a more holistic 
approach to evidence, apologetics, and faith itself. Some may assume that 
the impact of the nineteenth century apologetic landscape is most notably 
a rejection of rationalism, but this would be an overstatement: “It would 
be quite wrong . . . to envision the Romantic Movement as simply the 
repudiation of the Age of Reason. Rather, the Romantics strove to enlarge 
the vision of the eighteenth-century and to return to a wider, more richly 
diversified tradition.”38 They simply were “unwilling to reduce experience 
either to an abstract rationalism or a narrow, scientific empiricism. 
Experience involved much that eluded both analytical reasoning and 
scientific experiment, including the power of imagination, feeling, and 
intuition.”39  
 John Henry Newman, Anglican priest and theologian, published 
his Sermons, Chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief in 1844. He also had 
a disdain for rationalistic evidence. James C. Livingston even argued that 
Newman found Paley’s arguments “repellant,” the problem with this style of 
apologetics being that it attempted “to prove Christianity independently of 
the grace of faith . . . religious faith and truth may on occasion be justified by 
reason, but reason never can produce faith. Religious knowledge arises from 
moral obedience, out of hunger and thirst after righteousness.”40 Newman did 
not attempt to make an analysis of the change in apologetic styles over the 
two centuries, but did allow himself to make this argument:
I have not here to make any formal comparison of the last century 
with the present, or to say whether they are nearer the truth, who 
in these matters advance with the present age, or who loiter behind 
with the preceding. I will only state what seems to me meant when 
persons disparage the Evidences,—viz. they consider that, as a 
37. Bernard M.G. Reardon, Religious Thought in the Victorian Age, 52.
38. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 83.
39. Ibid., 84.
40. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 176.
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general rule, religious minds embrace the Gospel mainly on the great 
antecedent probability of a revelation, and the suitableness of the 
Gospel to their needs; on the other hand, that on men of irreligious 
minds Evidences are thrown away. Further, they perhaps would say, 
that to insist much on matters which are for the most part so useless 
for any practical purpose, draw men away from the true view of 
Christianity, and leads them to think that Faith is mainly the result of 
argument, that religious Truth is a legitimate matter of disputation, 
and that they who reject it rather err in judgment than commit sin. 
They think they see in the study in question a tendency to betray 
the sacredness and dignity of Religion, when those who profess 
themselves its champions allow themselves to stand on the same 
ground as philosophers of the world, admit the same principles, and 
only aim at drawing different conclusions. For is not this the error, 
the common and fatal error, of the world, to think itself a judge of 
Religious Truth without preparation of heart?41
 As discussed in other areas of the book, MacDonald realized that 
without the person being a true person, no argument would shake his already-
held belief. In Newman’s words, there has to be a “preparation of heart” in 
order for these evidences to root into one’s cognitive soil. Even if there was 
evidence that would change one’s mind, it likely would not end in saving 
faith: “I do but say that it is antecedent probability that gives meaning 
to those arguments from fact which are commonly called the Evidences 
of Revelation; that, whereas mere probability proves nothing, mere facts 
persuade no one; that probability is to fact, as the soul to the body; that mere 
presumptions may have no force, but that mere facts have no warmth. A 
mutilated and defective evidence suffices for persuasion where the heart is 
alive; but dead evidences, however perfect, can but create a dead faith.”42 In 
Newman’s mind, the evidences that might produce belief would only produce 
mere belief and not saving faith, nor a relationship with the living God. 
 In the same vein as Chateaubriand, Newman did not completely 
disregard rationalistic evidences; he found that they could have their place 
among the laity and Christian scholars alike:
Yet, serious as these dangers may be, it does not therefore follow that 
the Evidences may not be of great service to persons in particular 
41. John Henry Newman, Sermons, Chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief: Preached Before 
the University of Oxford (London: Francis and John Rivington, 1844), 189-190.
42. John Henry Newman, Sermons, Chiefly on the Theory of Religious Belief, 191-192.
frames of mind. Careless persons may be startled by them as they 
might be startled by a miracle, which is no necessary condition 
of believing, notwithstanding. Again, they often serve as a test 
of honesty of mind; their rejection being the condemnation of 
unbelievers. Again, religious persons sometimes get perplexed and 
lose their way; are harassed by objections; see difficulties which 
they cannot surmount; are a prey to subtlety of mind or over-anxiety. 
Under these circumstances the varied proofs of Christianity will 
be a stay, a refuge, an encouragement, a rallying point for Faith, 
a gracious economy; and even in the case of the most established 
Christian are they a source of gratitude and reverent admiration, and 
a means of confirming faith and hope.43
 Thus, Newman saw rational arguments as potential discipleship 
material, or possibly used as an uplifting devotional; but needless to say, he 
did not find them useful for evangelistic means. 
 Charles Hodge was a Presbyterian and Calvinist who taught at 
Princeton for fifty-eight years and “is the person most associated with and 
representative of the Princeton Theology.”44 He published multiple works, 
but the one with substantial apologetics content was his Systematic Theology, 
first published in 1865. Of the nineteenth-century thinkers mentioned earlier, 
Hodge would be most aligned with Paley’s apologetic approach, and he even 
suggested Paley’s Natural Theology to his readers as a good demonstration 
that God uses the physical world to proclaim his existence and his glory.45  
Hodge, who held his position at Princeton through much of the century, 
noticed the trend in apologetics to demean the rationalistic arguments 
and reacted thus:  “The arguments are not designed so much to prove the 
existence of an unknown being, as to demonstrate that the Being who reveals 
himself to man in the very constitution of his nature must be all that Theism 
declares him to be. Such writers as Hume, Kant, Coleridge, and the whole 
school of transcendental philosophers, have more or less expressly denied the 
validity of the ordinary arguments for the existence of a personal God.”46  
 He did not succumb to this cultural pressure, but instead doubled 
down on the traditional approach. He argued: “The existence of God is an 
43. Ibid., 191.
44. James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 304.
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objective fact. It may be shown that it is a fact which cannot be rationally 
denied. Although all men have feelings and convictions which necessitate 
the assumption that there is a God; it is, nevertheless, perfectly legitimate 
to show that there are other facts which necessarily lead to the same 
conclusion.”47 Hodge did not merely defend Natural Theology but even 
rationalism itself, and argued the classical arguments for God’s existence. 
Thus, even in the midst of the nineteenth century and the reaction against 
rationalism from the skeptics and Romantics alike, there were those who still 
held to traditional, rational apologetics. 
 Alexander Balmain Bruce (1831-99), who was the professor of 
Apologetics and New Testament exegesis at Free Church Hall, had a unique 
view. Reardon argued that “Apologetics was necessary—and Bruce himself 
was the author of a well-known treatise thereon—but he despaired of any 
successful defense of traditionalist positions. The apologist’s proper task 
is to present the Christianity of Christ himself, in the assurance that its 
intrinsic worth must convince any man of good will.”48 In his Apologetics: or, 
Christianity Defensively Stated Bruce wrote:
When one considers the facts connected with the history of theistic 
evidence: how few arguments command the general assent even 
of theists, how much the line of proof adopted depends on the 
advocate’s philosophic viewpoint, and how little respect the rival 
schools of philosophy pay to all methods of establishing the common 
faith but their own, he is tempted to think that that faith is without 
sure foundation, and that the agnostic is right when he asserts 
that knowledge of God is unattainable. But there is another way 
of looking at the matter which deserves serious attention. While 
differing as to what proofs are valid and valuable, all theists are 
agreed as to the thing to be proved: that God is, and to a certain 
extent what God is. This harmony in belief ought to weigh more in 
our judgment than the variation in evidence. It suggests the thought 
that the belief in God is antecedent to evidence, and that in our 
theistic reasonings we formulate proof of a foregone conclusion 
innate and inevitable. How otherwise can it be explained that men 
who have demolished what have passed for the strongest arguments 
for the theistic creed are not content to be done with it, but hold 
on to the conviction that God is, on grounds which to all others 
47. Ibid., 203.
48. Bernard M.G. Reardon, Religious Thought in the Victorian Age, 313.
but themselves appear weak and whimsical? Thus a recent writer, 
after searching in vain the whole universe of matter and of mind 
for traces of Deity, finds rest at last for his weary spirit in this train 
of thought: There is such a thing as error, but error is inconceivable 
unless there be such a thing as truth, and truth is inconceivable unless 
there be a seat of truth, an infinite all-including Thought or Mind, 
therefore such a Mind exists. That Mind is God, the “infinite Seer,” 
whose nature it is to think, not to act. “No power it is to be resisted, 
no plan-maker to be foiled by fallen angels, nothing finite, nothing 
striving, seeking, losing, altering, growing weary; the All-Enfolder 
it is, and we know its name. Not Heart, nor Love, though these also 
are in it and of it; Thought it is, and all things are for Thought, and 
in it we live and move.” How weak the proof here, but how strong 
the conviction! So it is, more or less, with us all. In our formal 
argumentation we feebly and blunderingly try to assign reasons for a 
belief that is rooted in our being. In perusing works by others devoted 
to the advocacy of theism, we are conscious of disappointment, and 
possibly even of doubt suggested rather than of faith established, 
only to recover serene and strong conviction when the book is 
forgotten. It would seem as if the way of wisdom were to abstain 
from all attempts at proving the divine existence, and, assuming as a 
datum that God is, to restrict our inquiries to what He is.49 
 To those uninitiated in the thought of Bruce, it would likely seem 
that he was at once supporting and denouncing the apologetic method. Once 
one understands the limited intention and role he ascribed to apologetics, the 
argument becomes clear:
Apologetic [sic], then, as I conceive it, is a preparer of the way of 
faith, an aid to faith against doubts whencesoever arising, especially 
such as are engendered by philosophy and science. Its specific aim is 
to help men of ingenuous spirit who, while assailed by such doubts, 
are morally in sympathy with believers. It addresses itself to such 
as are drawn in two directions, towards and away from Christ, as 
distinct from such as are confirmed either in unbelief or in faith. 
Defence presupposes a foe, but the foe is not the dogmatic infidel 
who has finally made up his mind that Christianity is a delusion, but 
49. Alexander Balmain Bruce, Apologetics; or, Christianity Definitely Stated (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1892), 157-158.
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anti-Christian thought in the believing man’s own heart.50 
 Thus, in Bruce’s mind, the apologetic arguments can be helpful, 
and indeed, he made strides to produce his own, but these were not geared 
to convert the staunch nonbeliever. Apologetics appeals to those who have 
a “moral sympathy” with Christians, or those men and women who have 
doubts that arise in their minds. Thus, for Bruce, apologetics was not as much 
pre-evangelism, even though there is an element of that, but it normatively 
took a form of defensive discipleship. 
 For Christian thought and apologetics in the nineteenth century, the 
conflict between the traditional, rationalistic approach, and the romantic, 
experiential approach came to a pinnacle. The prior age “was to suppose 
that the understanding is competent to treat of what belongs to the sphere 
of reason . . . [they] had reduced spiritual religion to mere rationalism.”51 
Thus, while some stayed firmly planted in this mindset and it is a mistake 
to over-simplify to the contrary, others found their evidences not in external 
arguments and scientific facts, but rather an “inner witness of moral feeling 
and perception.”52 To determine whether this had beneficial or detrimental 
consequences is not the intention of this study, but rather, to demonstrate 
and survey the current apologetic milieu in which George MacDonald lived, 
reasoned, and wrote.  
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